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Abstract. This paper extends the standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model to agents who cannot smooth consumption (i.e. spenders) and 
are affected by external consumption habits. Although these assumptions are not new, 
their joint consideration strongly affects some theoretical and empirical results addressed 
by the recent literature. By deriving closed-form solutions, we identify different demand 
regimes  and  show that  they  are  characterized  by  specific  features  regarding  dynamic 
stability and monetary policy effectiveness. We also evaluate our model by stochastic 
simulations obtained from the Bayesian parameters estimates for the G7 economies. From 
posterior impulse responses we address the empirical relevance of the different regimes 
and provide comparative evidence on the heterogeneity of monetary policy effects among 
countries.   
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1. Introduction 
This  paper  extends  the  standard  New  Keynesian  DSGE  model  by  considering  that 
some  agents  may  not  be  able  to  smooth  consumption  and  may  have  consumption 
habits. Although both assumptions are not new in the literature, the joint consideration 
of these two features of consumption behavior strongly affects the results addressed by 
the recent literature, both theoretically and empirically. 
Evidence on the existence of heterogeneous consumers has been first provided, nearly 
fifteen years ago, by Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990, 1991). According to them, 
only  a  fraction  of  households  (savers)  is  able  to  plan  consumption  along  with  the 
standard  Hall’s  consumption  function,  while  a  relevant  fraction  of  households 
(spenders) equates current consumption to current income period by period (violating 
the permanent income hypothesis).
1  
The policy implications of the introduction of  spenders in the model are important. 
Considering fiscal policy, if consumers are not able to smooth consumption, the Barro-
Ricardo  equivalence  does  not  hold.  For  this  reason,  savers  are  often  referred  to  as 
Ricardian consumers and spenders as non-Ricardian consumers.
2  
Recently,  economists  have  instead  focused  on  the  effects  of  spenders  on  monetary 
policy by considering agents that consume according to a rule-of-thumb behavior within 
the New Keynesian theoretical apparatus. They find that the presence of rule-of-thumb 
consumers may overturn some of the conventional policy prescriptions addressed by the 
literature.  
Galì et al. (2004), e.g., explore the Taylor rule properties when considering rule-of-
thumb  households  and  show  that  the  Taylor  principle  1)  may  be  not  a  sufficient 
criterion  for  stability  when  there  are  many  rule-of-thumb  consumers;  2)  becomes  a 
sufficient  but  non  necessary  condition  for  stability  when  monetary  policy  is  set 
according to a standard (feedback) Taylor rule. Instead, in the case of forward-looking 
interest rate rules, conditions for a unique equilibrium are somewhat different from the 
usual ones.
                                                
1 Spenders’ behavior can be interpreted in various ways. One can view their behavior as resulting from 
consumers  who  face  binding  borrowing  constraints.  Alternatively,  myopic  deviations  from  the 
assumption  of  fully  rational  expectations  should  be  assumed  (rule-of-thumb),  i.e.  consumers  naively 
extrapolate their current income into the future, or weigh their current income too heavily when looking 
ahead to their future income because current income is the most salient piece of information available. 
See  Mankiw  (2000)  and  references  therein.  Note  that  whatever  the  reason  why  some  agents  do  not 
smooth consumption, their analytical modeling is however similar and for this reason we will generically 
refer to rule-of-thumb consumers to include both categories of non-smoothing consumers. 
2 See Rockerbie (1997), Mankiw (2000), Habibullah et al. (2006) Muscatelli et al. (2006). 3
Amato and Laubach (2003) explore the optimal monetary rule when considering rule-
of-thumb households and firms. By modeling consumers’ rule-of-thumb behavior as a 
consumption  habit,  households’  current  decisions  mimic  past  behavior  of  all  agents 
(including optimizing agents). They show that, while the monetary policy implications 
of rule-of-thumb firms are minimal, the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers alters the 
determination of the optimal interest rate. As their fraction increases, higher inertial 
monetary policy is required.  
Similar results are found by Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007a), who however focus on 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. They find that, although an increase in consumers 
who  cannot  access  to  the  financial  markets  (and  thus  cannot  smooth  consumption) 
reduces effects of interest rate policies via the consumption inter-temporal allocation 
(according to the permanent income effect), monetary policy becomes more effective as 
the degree of financial markets participation falls. In fact, after a change in the interest 
rate, spenders and savers revise their consumption plans in the same direction, because 
the fall of the interest rate supports the increase of current output also by  affecting 
spenders’  consumption  through  higher  real  wages  (staggered  prices  in  fact  imply  a 
decline in the mark-up after an initial increase in economic activity; this allows real 
wages to increase, leads to a boom in rule-of-thumb consumption, generates inflation 
and improves the effectiveness of monetary policy).  
By using a simplified version of Galì et al. (2004), Bilbiie (2005) and Di Bartolomeo 
and Rossi (2007b) find that, for high fractions of rule-of-thumb (ROT) consumers, the 
interest rate increase becomes expansionary, thus showing that two-demand regimes can 
emerge (according to the “slope” of IS curve).
3  
On the empirical side, rule-of-thumb consumption has been considered consistent with 
the puzzling result of a weak or positive relationship between expected consumption 
growth  and  real  interest  rates  (Ahmad,  2005,  Goodhart  and  Hofmatin  2005,  Bilbiie 
2006, Canzoneri et al., 2006). The empirical relevance of the New Keynesian DSGE 
theoretical  predictions  is  however  still  ambiguous,  since  its  evaluation  has  been 
generally  obtained  by  estimating  reduced-form  forward-looking  IS  curves,  whose 
coefficients are only a convolution of the deep parameters.
4  
                                                
3 More specifically, Bilbiie (2006) addresses the implications of limited asset market participation for 
optimal monetary policy, from both a theoretical and empirical
3 point of view. His main finding is that 
when limited asset market participation is considered a passive interest rate rule is consistent with a 
welfare-maximizing monetary policy. In this context, a passive policy does not lead to indeterminacy. 
4 Fuhrer and Olivei (2005) provide empirical evidence for the parameters of a reduced form IS equation, 
defined in a standard New Keynesian model augmented with habits. Sensitivity of income to changes in 4
The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  extend  the  aforementioned  literature  both 
theoretically and empirically. We firstly derive an analytical closed-form solution of the 
model and study its stability regions, and then we evaluate the model by stochastic 
simulations, obtained from Bayesian parameters estimates for the G7 economies.  
In  order  to  derive  a  closed-form  solution  of  the  model,  as  in  the  standard  New-
Keynesian models, we do not consider capital accumulation.
5 This also allows us to 
simply  discuss  the  dynamic  properties  of  the  model.  According  to  the  fraction  of 
spenders,  we  analytically  discriminate  between  two  demand  regimes  (i.e.  two  IS-
curves), defined according to the response of the aggregate demand to nominal interest 
rate movements. We show that the possibility of a demand regime shift has a dramatic 
importance for the analysis of monetary policy effectiveness (discussed by Amato and 
Laubach,  2003;  Di  Bartolomeo  and  Rossi,  2007a,  2007b).  We  then  show  that  the 
consideration of external habits reduces the probability of obtaining a regime shift in the 
demand schedule, as it  increases the threshold  fraction of spenders above which  an 
inversion of the slope of the IS-curve is obtained.
6  
The possibility of a demand regime shift has remarkable implications for the analysis of 
equilibrium determinacy, as discussed in Bilbiie (2005, 2006) and Di Bartolomeo and 
Rossi (2007b). On this respect we show that, the unconventional results stressed by Galì 
et al. (2004) hold only if the relationship between the nominal interest rate and the 
aggregate demand is positive, i.e. when the IS-curve is positively sloped.  
The second stage of the analysis focuses on the empirical evaluation of the theoretical 
predictions of the model. Our investigation aims to evaluate the empirical relevance of 
the regime inversion from a direct estimate of the structural parameters of the model. 
Moreover, our analysis aims to providing an assessment of the heterogeneous effects of 
monetary policy. The values of the structural parameters are not calibrated or fixed on 
the  basis  of  previous  evidence,  as  in  the  standard  practice.  Because  of  our  strong 
empirical bearing, we estimate the structural coefficients employing quarterly data for 
the seven most industrialized economies (G7) for the 1963-2003 period. Differently 
from the common practice emerging in recent studies (see Smets and Wouters, 2003; 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the real interest rate is weakly negative or insignificant. Bilbiie (2005) explicitly deals with the issue of 
the  monetary  policy  implications  of  the  presence  of  relevant  liquidity  constraints  in  consumption 
behavior. Even in this case, the use of a reduced-form IS curve does not allow a direct estimate of the 
fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. 
5 As in a basic New Keynesian model (e.g. see Galì 2008 or Woodford 2003) we do not consider capital 
accumulation. Ricardian consumers thus have the possibility to save only in the short run by pursuing 
firms bonds. Savings are zero only at the equilibrium where output equals consumption. 
6 In this case the numerical solution of the model is needed, since the joint consideration of external habits 
and of ROT consumers increases the complexity and nonlinearity of the model. 5
Coenen and Straub, 2005), we consider country-level data separately in order to stress 
the  cross-country  heterogeneity.  The  complexity  and  nonlinearity  of  the  resulting 
structure of the model suggests the implementation of a Bayesian Monte-Carlo Markov 
Chain estimation procedure (MCMC).
7  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines  the  basic 
theoretical framework and describes the two demand regimes implied by the presence of 
rule-of-thumb consumers and external habits; it further discusses the properties of the 
model by closely analyzing the rational expectation equilibrium determinacy and the 
transmission  mechanism  of  monetary  policy.  Section  3  provides  the  details  of  the 
empirical evaluation of the model and the interpretation of the main results. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. The basic theoretical framework
2.1. The model  
We  consider  a  simple  New  Keynesian  model  augmented  with  both  non-Ricardian 
consumers  and  habits  formation.  In  order  to  simplify  the  analysis  and  highlight  the 
demand-side effects of spenders’ behavior we do not consider the capital accumulation 
process. The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived heterogeneous 
agents normalized to one. A fraction 1 λ −  of them consumes and accumulates wealth as 
in the standard setup (savers). The remaining fraction λ  is composed by agents who do 
not own any asset, cannot smooth consumption, and therefore consume all their current 
disposable income (spenders). We also assume that savers consumption at time  t i +
depends  on  habits  inherited  from  past  consumption,  i.e.  on  a  fraction  γ   of  lagged 
aggregate  consumption.  Type-specific  representative  consumers  are  indexed  by  R
(Ricardian  or  savers)  and  N   (non-Ricardian  or  spenders).  At  time  t,  they  plan  to 
maximize the following utility:  
(1)  ( ) ￿
∞
=
+ − + +
0
1 , , ,
i
j j




t N C C u E φ β { } N R
j , ∈ φ
where  ( ) 0 1 β ∈ ,  is the discount factor. 
j φ  is a binary variable such that when  j R = , 
1
R φ =  and when  j N = ,  0
N φ = .  
                                                
7 Our analysis is close in spirit to the strategy proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003) for the estimation 
of their New Keynesian model. The main differences with respect to their analysis are that we do not 
consider capital accumulation and that we introduce Non-Ricardian consumers.  6
j
t C is the household j consumption at time  t, 
j
t N is labor supply and finally  t C  is the 
aggregate  consumption,  which  represents  households  external  habits.  Regarding  the 
functional form, we assume logarithmic utility to permit the analytical derivation of the 
closed-form  solution  of  the  model.  Although  simplistic,  the  logarithmic  utility 
hypothesis allows the derivation of the log-linear model representation without having 
to  impose  the  evenly  restrictive  assumption  of  equal  income  between  savers  and 
spenders in the steady state. The instantaneous utility is thus:  
(2)          () ( ) ( ) 1 . ln ln 1
j j j
t i t i t u C C N gf k + + - = - + -   
where  0 1 γ ≤ ≤   and  0 κ >   are  parameters.  The  former  measures  the  impact  of  the 
consumption habits, the latter measures labor disutility with respect to consumption.
8   





j j j j t t t t
t t t
t t





+ ￿ ￿ −
= + − ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
where  t W  is the nominal wage and 
R
t D  is real dividend payments on the portfolio of 
shares  of  Ricardian  households,  which  are  equal  to  (1  −  ￿)
-1  times  total  monopoly 
profits. 
R
t B  is a portfolio of bonds carried in period t+1 by Ricardian households, 
1
t R
−  is 
the riskless gross short-term interest rate. 
9  
Real wages are the unique source of spenders’ disposable income; therefore, they are 
subject to a static budget constraint, while savers face a standard dynamic constraint. 
Since spenders do not save, they consume all their current income 
By  solving  the  inter-temporal  optimization  problems  of  savers  and  spenders, 
aggregating, and then log-linearizing around the steady-state, we obtain the following 
description of the demand side of the economy: 
(4)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
N N
t t t t i t t t t t t c i E E c c E w p
ϖ λζ ϖ λζ
π
ϖ ϖ ϖ ϖ
+ + − + +
− −
= − − + + − ∆ −
+ + + +
(5)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 t t t t t w p n c c υ ϖ ϖ ϖ − − = + − − −
where  t c  is consumption,  t i  is the nominal interest rate,  t π  is the inflation rate and 
t t p w −   is  the  real  wage.  Concerning  parameters,  ( ) 1 ϖ γ λ = −   is  the  “aggregate” 
                                                
8 Only Ricardian consumers have consumption habits in order to impose that spenders cannot smooth 
consumption neither by financial markets nor by labor supply. Spenders consume their current income 
and supply a constant amount of labor and aggregate consumption do not influence their consumption-
leisure choice.  
9 Recall that φ
N=0 and φ
R=1, i.e. rule-of-thumb consumers do not save and do not own firms. See Di 
Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007b) for more details. See also Galì at al. (2003) and Bilbiie (2005).  7
external  habit  parameter,  since  consumption  habits  are  only  relevant  for  savers; 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 N N υ θκ ϖ
− − − = − = −  is the inverse Frish elasticity;  ( ) ( )
1 1 0 1 θ η η
− = − ∈ ,  is 
inverse  mark-up,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  elasticity  of  substitution  among 
intermediate goods η; κ  indicates labor disutility, and   ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1
N ζ κ κ υ ϖ
−
= + + −
is the share of spenders’ consumption at the steady state.   
Equation (4) is a modified version of the standard consumption Euler equation while 
equation (5) describes the aggregate labor supply. Our Euler equation (4) differs from 
the standard version considering habits formation only, since consumption also depends 
on expected changes in the real wage. The economic rationale is that the presence of 
savers establishes a relationship between the demand for goods and the real wage.  
Considering the economy production function  t t t n a y + =  ( t a  is a technology level 
variable),  the  resource  constraint,  t t y c =   and  equation  (5),  the  consumption  Euler 
equation (4) can be expressed as a modified IS-curve: 




1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
N N
t t t t N N y E y y
ϖ ϖ λζ λζ υ ϖ
ϖ λζ υ ϖ λζ υ ϖ ϖ
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ −
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+ − + − + − + −
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1
1 1 1 1
N N
t t t t t N N i E E a
ϖ λζ λζ υ
π
ϖ λζ υ ϖ λζ υ ϖ ϖ
+ +
− −
− − + ∆
+ − + − + − + −
. 
The next subsection will discuss equation (6) in more detail.  
As  in  the  standard  New-Keynesian  framework,  the  supply  side  of  the  economy  is 
described by a continuum of firms producing differentiated intermediate goods for a 
perfectly competitive final goods market. Intermediate sector firms cannot adjust their 
prices period by period; conversely, each firm in each period faces a certain probability 
of being able to do it (the Calvo’s lottery). Thus, in setting their price firms consider the 
future marginal costs (by considering inflation expectations) in addition to the current 
marginal  cost.  As  a  result,  the  price-adjustment  mechanism  is  described  by  the 
following forward-looking relationship: 
(7)  1 t t t t E mc π β π τ + = +
with  ( )( )
1 1 1 . τ ϕ βϕ ϕ
− = − −  The parameter  ϕ  defines the degree of price staggering, 
i.e. the fraction of firms maintaining their price fixed each period. By considering labor 
as the sole input of the intermediate sector and a standard linear production function, the 
sticky-price equilibrium real marginal cost is given by: 8










= − − +
− −
. 
Since  we  assume  that  markup  is  constant  at  the  steady-state,  under  flexible-price 
equilibrium the log-linearized real marginal costs are zero. Substituting (8) in (6) and 
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1
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1 1 1 1
f f
t t t y a y
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+ − + −
. 
The flexible-price output is a weighted average of technology and of its past value. The 
inertial  component  of  output  is  increasing  in  the  aggregate  habit  parameter  and 
decreasing in the inverse Frisch labor elasticity. Thus, the introduction of rule-of-thumb 
consumers reduces the role played by the inertial component in the natural rate of output 
adjustment process since it reduces the aggregate habit parameter. If habit persistence is 
not present, equation (9) collapses to the standard natural output equation.  
Considering equations (8) and (9), from the price adjustment equation (7) we derive the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
(10)  ( )
( )( ) 1 1
f






= + − .
−
Notice  that  if  we  assume  nonzero  habit  persistence  in  consumption,  the  fraction  of 
spenders affects the coefficient for the inflation response to the output gap, otherwise it 
has no role.  
Model  dynamics  is  fully  described  by  three  equations:  the  demand  side,  i.e.  the 
modified IS curve (6), the supply-side, i.e. the New Keynesian Phillips curve (10), and 
equation  (9), defining the flexible-price natural rate of output.  
The  assumption  of  rule-of-thumb  consumers  crucially  affects  the  first  of  the  above 
relationship  that,  in  turn,  is  relevant  for  the  dynamic  and  stability  properties  of  the 
model, as we are going to show in the next two subsections. 
2.2. Demand regimes and rule-of-thumb consumers 
The existence of spenders has serious implications for the determination of the size and 
sign  of  the  relationship  between  the  demand  and  the  nominal  interest  rate.  Ceteris 
paribus  by  increasing  the  fraction  of  rule-of-thumb  consumers,  we  can  generate  an 
inversion in the sign of the interest rate impact on aggregate demand, i.e., on aggregate 
income.  9
According to the sign of the interest rate elasticity, defined as  / t t y i Ω = ∂ ∂ , equation (6) 
identifies two different demand regimes:  
• A standard demand regime – which implies a standard negatively sloped IS curve 
– holds if the interest rate elasticity is positive (since it enters with a negative 
sign). Such a regime is consistent with the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis 
and thus with consumption smoothing; 
• An inverse demand regime – which implies a positively sloped IS curve – holds if 
the  interest  rate  elasticity  is  negative.  In  other  words,  the  demand  regime  is 
dominated  by  rule-of-thumb  behavior;  an  increase  in  real  interest  rates  is 
expansionary and interest rate cuts imply demand contractions.  
As in Di Bartolomeo and Rossi (2007b), if external habits are not present, i.e.  0 γ =  or 
0 ϖ = ,  
N ζ  and  υ  do not depend on the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers  and 
f
t t y a =  and it is easy to show that the emergence of a particular demand regime only 
depends on a threshold value of λ .  
















.   
If inequality (11) is not satisfied, the inverse demand regime emerges. For relatively low 
values of  θ  (thus for low values of the elasticity of substitution among intermediate 
goods) and high values of labor disutility κ , the threshold value can be greater than one 
( 1 λ
∗ > ). In such a case, only the standard regime occurs since  [ ] 0,1 λ∈ . For relatively 
high values of  θ  and low values of  κ , the liquidity-constrained regime can emerge. 
Notice that if θ  is greater than 0 5 . λ
∗ is always smaller than one. Thus, in such a likely
case
10, the inverse regime can emerge for sufficiently high values of λ .  
The intuition of the regimes can be explained by comparing the main macro frameworks 
based on general equilibrium model and considering that the interest rate has a direct 
effect (by the agent decision of smoothing) and an indirect effect (by the labor market 
and real wage) on consumption of output. More in detail, in a standard real business 
cycle model an increase of the interest rate generates a reduction in current consumption 
(direct effect) and an increase in the labor supply of the agents who aim to increase their 
savings; as result the real wage falls (i.e. the labor market indirect effect of the change 
                                                
10 The θ parameter is bigger than 0.5 if the intermediate goods elasticity of substitution η is bigger than 2. 
The inverse regime is thus possible for mark-up values below 100%. 10
of  the  interest  rate  on  consumption  has  the  same  direction  of  the  direct  effect).  By 
introducing nominal rigidities, as in New Keynesian DSGE models, the increase of the 
interest rate still generates a reduction in current consumption and an increase in the 
labor  supply,  but  because  of  the  price  stickiness  it  also  implies  a  markup  fall  and 
deflation. Labor demand also shifts and real wage increases instead of falling. However, 
in  a  standard  New  Keynesian  model  the  real  wage  effect  is  small  and  as  result 
consumption fall even if less than in the real business cycle case. By introducing the 
rule-of-thumb  consumer  the  effect  of  the  real  wage  increases  is  amplified,  a  small 
increase of the real wage has strong effect on current consumption since spenders do not 
save. Thus, when the spender fraction is high, the indirect effect via labor market can 
dominate the direct effect of an increase of the interest rate, which now support an 
higher consumption (output) level instead of a lower one.  
The effects of the spenders’ fraction on regime inversion are non linear. On the one 
hand, a reduction in the savers’ fraction supports a more strong impact of the real wage 
on consumption (because spenders are more), but, on the other hand, it also reduces real 
wage increase caused by a positive change in the interest rate. When external habits are 
taken  into  account  the  study  of  the  sign  of  the  interest  rate  elasticity  is  even  more 
complex, since the parameters 
N ζ , υ  and ϖ  also depend on  λ . Thus, the analytical 
derivation  of  the  conditions  for  regime  shifts  becomes  problematic.  An  implicit 
condition for observing the standard regime can be derived: 
(12)  ( ) ( )







κ ϖ ϖ θ κ ϖ θ
− +
<
￿ ￿ − − + − + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
From the expression above it is clear that if θ increases the inverse regime is more likely 
to emerge for given values of rule-of-thumb consumption. Equation (12) is not simply 
to explain, above all because the effects of labor disutility κ and of the “aggregate” 
external habit parameter ϖ are more ambiguous since they appear both at the numerator 
and  denominator  of  the  ratio.  However,  by  numerical  simulations  we  find  that  the 
presence of external habits reduces the probability of observing a shift in the demand 
regime. In fact, we find that, ceteris paribus, the threshold value of λ  necessary to 
obtain  the  regime  inversion  increases  with  the  value  of  the  habit  parameter.  The 
intuition of our result is as follows: given the presence of consumption habits, savers 
consumption is less affected by a change in the real interest rate. This means that real 
wage and spenders’ consumption will increase less after a positive change in the interest 11
rate. Therefore savers consumption habits reduces the probability to have an increase on 
aggregate consumption (or equivalently on aggregate output) after an increase in the 
interest rate, i.e. external habits reduces the probability of observing a positive sloped IS 
curve. 
2.3 Demand regimes and equilibrium determinacy 
The recent literature on central banking has shown that one of the fundamental tasks of 
the monetary authority is to support rational expectation equilibrium determinacy. In 
order  to  close  the  model  and  study  determinacy,  we  consider  the  following  simple 
feedback Taylor rule:
11
(13)  1 2 1 t t t i y k α π α = + + , 
where  1 α  and  2 α  are positive parameters and  1 k  is a constant or a stochastic term 
(representing a stationary disturbance process), which does not affect the conditions for 
determinacy.  
Determinacy depends on two factors: the particular demand regime and monetary policy 
effectiveness. These factors correspond to, respectively, the sign and the size of the 
elasticity of income with respect to the interest rate. As previously stated, a positive 
(negative) sign occurs in the standard (inverse) regime; policy effectiveness increases in 
the elasticity modulus, i.e.  Ω .  
Under a contemporaneous Taylor rule, in the standard regime, determinacy requires an 
active policy rule satisfying: 





> − , 
where 
( )




− =  is the elasticity of the price adjustment with respect to the real output 
(see equation (10)). The condition has the usual interpretation: a rule satisfies the Taylor 
principle if, in the event of an increase of the inflation rate by one percentage point, the 
nominal interest rate is raised by more than one percentage point. Each percentage point 
of permanent increase in the inflation rate implies an increase in the long-run average 
output gap of  ( )
1 1 k β
− −  percent. An exogenous Taylor rule thus satisfies the Taylor 
principle if and only if  ( )
1
1 2 1 1 a k a β
− + − >  (see Woodford, 2004).  
                                                
11 John Taylor has proposed that the Fed monetary policy can be described by a rule as that considered 
here (see Taylor, 1993). Note also that the Taylor rule can be used to study the determinacy properties of 
an endogenous policy derived from the so-called flexible inflation targeting approach (Svensson, 1999; 
Evans and Honkapohja, 2006) or from utility-based welfare maximization (Woodford, 2003: Ch. 6).  12
In the inverse demand regime, determinacy requires (see Appendix A): 
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From  equation  (15)  we  obtain  that  a  rule  satisfying  the  Taylor  Principle  can  result 
insufficient for model determinacy. Thus a more aggressive rule, i.e. a rule that strongly 
react to current inflation, may be requested. Equation (16) implies that even a passive 
policy can lead to determinacy. However, if both values between brackets on the r.h.s. 
of the last term are negative, the equilibrium is always indeterminate. This occurs if the 
central bank places a high weight to output stabilization.  
In  the  standard  regime,  the  Taylor  principle  is  thus  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition for determinacy. By contrast, in the alternative regime, we have to consider 
three different cases. More specifically, determinacy may be related to the monetary 
policy effectiveness as follows.  










Taylor principle is a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. 
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,  the  Taylor 
principle is a sufficient condition for determinacy, even if not necessary, since a 
loose policy implies determinacy as well.  










the satisfaction of the Taylor principle is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition  for  determinacy.  In  fact,  even  a  more  aggressive  policy  condition 
leading to determinacy would be only sufficient, since under low effectiveness 
all passive policies lead to determinacy in a sort of “inverse Taylor principle”.     
The rationale of the inverse Taylor principle is that a positive non-fundamental shock in 
expectations  reduces  the  real  interest  rate;  in  the  liquidity-constrained  regime  this 
implies that, if the interest rate does not change at all or is set according to a passive 
rule, i.e. it does not increase a lot, output falls (by the aggregate demand), inflation 
decreases (by the aggregate supply), and expectations are thus not self fulfilled. By 
contrast, if the interest rate increases a lot (e.g. it satisfies the Taylor principle), the real 13
interest  rate  will  increase,  then  output  and  inflation  will  also  increase  and  non-
fundamental shock in expectations will be self-fulfilled.  
2.4. Monetary policy effectiveness and transmission mechanisms 
As  long  as  different  demand  regimes  can  emerge,  different  policy  regimes  (i.e. 
transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy) may be required for model (price) 
stability. Policy regimes are related to both the sign of the elasticity of demand with 
respect  to  the  real  interest  rate  (demand  regime)  and  to  its  size  (monetary  policy 
effectiveness).  If  monetary  policy  is  set  according  to  a  Taylor  rule  of  the  kind  of 
equation (13) augmented with a white-noise shock (i.e. a monetary policy innovation), 
three different policy regimes can be identified (see Appendix B).  
1. In the standard demand regime ( 0 Ω < ) a positive policy shock has deflationary 
effects, as it leads to a reduction of inflation and of real output. The real interest 
rate increases. 
2. In the inverse regime ( 0 Ω > ) two different policy regimes can emerge:  
(a) If  ( )
1
1 2 a k a
−
Ω > + ,  an  unexpected  positive  policy  shock  has  the  same 
effects as in the standard regime. Even if the semi-elasticity of demand is 
positive, the real interest rate is moving in the opposite direction of the 
nominal rate.  
(b) If  ( )
1
1 2 a k a
−
Ω < + , a positive policy shock leads to increased output and 
inflation, and the real interest rate falls.
12
The rationale of the two non-standard policy regimes (a) and (b) can be interpreted as 
follows.  In  the  inverse  regime  a  positive  monetary  policy  shock  initially  shifts  the 
aggregate  demand  schedule  backwards,  leading  to  a  reduction  of  real  output  and 
inflation.  Lower  real  output  and  inflation  stimulate  an  expansionary  central  bank’s 
reaction, eventually leading to either an increase or a reduction of the real interest rate, 
depending on monetary policy effectiveness. Neglecting habits formation for simplicity, 
monetary policy effectiveness is increasing in the fraction of spenders in the standard 
demand regime and decreasing in the inverse demand regime. Considering habits, the 
study  of  transmission  mechanisms  becomes  analytically  intractable  and  numerical 
solutions are needed. In line with the results of the analysis of the model properties, 
from numerical simulations we have obtained that, other things equal, the probability of 
                                                
12  Note  that  this  regime  is  potentially  compatible  with  the  prize  puzzle,  i.e.  the  (apparent)  positive 
empirical relationship between the federal funds rate and inflation (Sims, 1992). 14
observing a standard regime and thus the typical policy regime increases with the size of 
the habit parameter. 
3. Bayesian MCMC estimation of the structural parameters
3.1 A brief description of the estimation approach 
In this section we provide the details of the empirical evaluation of the theoretical model 
described in the previous section. The computational task is cumbersome, since the 
convergence  performances  of  numerical  methods  for  Full  Information  Maximum 
Likelihood  (FIML)  estimation  may  be  affected  by  the  presence  of  nonlinearities  in 
model  parameters.
13  In  such  cases,  a  viable  solution  is  to  restrict  the  parameters 
estimates within a range that we deem as reasonable, i.e. to employ a restricted FIML 
estimator. However, since outcomes would by definition depend on the assumptions on 
the range of admissible values (priors), we adopt a more structured Bayesian Monte 
Carlo estimation approach.
14   
Bayesian estimation for DSGE models is close in spirit to restricted FIML estimation, 
since the subjective element is specified in both cases. The peculiarity of the Bayesian 
MCMC approach is that, instead of employing interval restrictions on parameters, it 
requires  to  nest  formalized  distributional  priors  on  parameters  with  the  conditional 
distribution (i.e. the likelihood) in order to obtain the posterior distribution.  
We will consider the posterior density as the benchmark distribution for Monte Carlo 
integration.  The  final  estimates  will  be  obtained  employing  the  Metropolis-Hastings 
procedure implemented in Dynare for Matlab (Juillard, 2004).  
The posterior distribution is the result of a weighted average of the prior non sample 
information and the conditional distribution (i.e. the empirical information); weights are 
inversely related to, respectively, the variance of the prior distributions and the variance 
of  the  sample  information  (“precisions”).  The  bigger  the  informative  power  of  the 
likelihood (i.e. the lesser the variances of the likelihood-based estimates), the closer the 
posterior will be to the conditional distribution. In the limiting case in which data allow 
a perfect knowledge of parameters, the posterior distribution collapses to the conditional 
distribution. Contrary, if empirical information is weakly informative, the priors will 
                                                
13 For some reference applications of the methodology, see Ireland (2004). 
14 In our applications we follow the Bayesian strategy adopted in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), which 
in turn draws on Geweke (1997, 1999), Landon-Lane (2000), Otrok (2001), Fernandez-Villaverde and 
Rubio-Ramirez (2004) and Schorfheide (2000). 15
correspondingly have more weight in estimation. Formalizing a tight prior will result in 
highly constrained estimation, while a diffuse prior will result in weakly constrained 
estimation.  
Formally, our procedure requires nesting the prior distribution  ( ) ￿ P  for the vector of 
parameters  ￿ ￿∈  and the conditional distribution
15 ( ) ￿ | T Y P ,  { }
T
t t T y Y 1 = =  to get the 
posterior distribution  ( ) T Y P | ￿ . This is basically obtained employing the Bayes rule: 







￿ = , 
where  ( ) T Y P  is the marginal distribution.  
Once the posterior distribution is obtained, it is employed as the “proposal density” to 
initialize  the  Metropolis-Hastings  MCMC  sampling  method
16,  which  substantially 
generates a large number of random draws from the posterior density in order to obtain 
a Monte-Carlo estimate of parameters’ distributions. 
The  model  is  estimated  employing  four  variables:  log  real  private  output,  first 
differences of the log GDP deflator (i.e. the inflation rate), the quarterly nominal interest 
rate and a measure of log real output gap.  
The choice of working with four variables is justified by our model assumptions. Since 
we do not consider capital in the production technology, there is no need of considering 
consumption and investment at the estimation stage. Our estimation approach is close in 
spirit to that employed by Ireland (2004) and Fernandez–Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez 
(2004,  2007),  who  use  two  and  three  detrended  variables,  respectively.
17  The  main 
peculiarity of our approach is that we employ an empirical measure of the output gap 
rather than relying on the theory-based measure.  
Sample information is quarterly and spans from 1963:1 to 2003:2 for each of the G7 
countries  being  considered.  In  the  benchmark  formulations,  we  employ  short-term 
nominal interest rate definitions such as the Federal Funds Rate for the United States, 
the Overnight Rate for Canada and the United Kingdom and the Money Call Rate for 
the remaining countries.  
In  order  to  check  for  robustness,  we  also  re-run  the  estimations  by  substituting  the 
                                                
15 The conditional distribution is obtained employing the Kalman filter (Sargent, 1989). 
16  More  precisely,  the  algorithm  employs  the  mode  and  the  Hessian  evaluated  at  the  mode  for  the 
initialization of the Metropolis-Hastings procedure. 
17 Larger models are generally estimated employing richer data-sets. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007),  
Del  Negro  et  al.  (2007)  and  Giuli  and  Tancioni  (2009)  employ  seven  variables  for  the  Bayesian 
estimation of their extended models.     16
reference short-term rates with the three months Treasury Bill Rate and the 10-years 
Government  Bonds  Rate.  Data  are  all  drawn  from  the  IMF  International  Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database. Log real output gap is obtained as the difference between log 
real  output  and  its  trend,  the  latter  approximated  by  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter. 
Following Smets and Wouters (2003), real output is de-trended assuming a linear trend 
while  both  inflation  and  the  nominal  interest  rate  –  because  of  their  co-trending 
behavior – are de-trended on the basis of the estimated linear component in inflation. 
Results  are  qualitatively  robust  to  the  specific  output  gap  measure  and  de-trending 
procedure being considered.
18     
3.2 Operational structure of the model and prior distributions  
The empirical version of the theoretical model described in section two is obtained by 
adding five structural i.i.d. shocks, a definition equation for the output  gap and the 
policy reaction function. To improve model fit, we assume a contemporaneous policy 
reaction rule with stochastic inflation target and interest rate smoothing. The resulting 
stochastic structural model is fully described by eleven equations:  
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18 We have employed alternative approximations of the output gap and different de-trending procedures 
for output, inflation and the nominal interest rate. Alternative approximations for the output gap are based 
on the Baxter-King and Christiano-Fitzgerald filters, while a second order polynomial has been employed 
as alternative de-trending procedure. Results can be obtained upon request from the authors.   17
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Equations (18.1) and (18.3) are equivalent, respectively, to the IS relation (6) and to the 
marginal cost equation (8), augmented with preference and cost push shocks. The fourth 
equation (18.4) is a Taylor-like rule in the spirit of that employed by Smets and Wouters 
(2003), which has proven good performances in terms of fit; 
∗
t π  is the stochastic policy 
target and 
i
t u  is a serially uncorrelated policy shock. The fifth equation (18.5) is the 
standard  output  gap  definition;  the  last  five  equations  (18.7)-(18.11)  specify  the 
stochastic processes driving the dynamics of the model.  
To avoid stochastic singularity, five structural (independent) shocks are considered: i) a 
preference shock 
pref
t ε ; ii) a technology shock 
a
t ε ; iii) a cost-push shock 
cp
t ε ; iv) a 
monetary policy shock 
i
t ε ; v) a shock to the monetary policy target, i.e. to targeted 
inflation, 
∗ π ε t .  
We assume three persistent (albeit stationary) components and two serially uncorrelated 
components. Preference, technology and monetary policy target shocks are somewhat 
persistent,  giving  rise  to  autoregressive  stationary  processes.  The  other  stochastic 
components are serially uncorrelated i.i.d. innovations.  
This characterization of the shocks is needed to reproduce the persistence and hump-
shaped  responses  found  in  the  data.  It  represents  a  quite  weak  assumption  from  a 
theoretical point of view, since it is commonly accepted that technology shocks, as well 
as preference shocks, have long-lasting effects, while the persistence of the monetary 
policy target can be justified on the grounds that, once committed on a given target, 
authorities change their mind slowly.  
The  shape  of  the  prior  distributions  is  chosen  according  to  the  following  standard 
assumptions: the reference distribution for the structural shocks is the inverted gamma 
distribution with two degrees of freedom, which is consistent with a diffuse prior on 
perturbations and positive variances; for parameters theoretically defined in a 0-1 range, 
we  assume  a  beta  distribution;  for  the  other  parameters  we  assume  a  normal 
distribution.  Prior  means  and  standard  deviations  are  defined  on  the  basis  of  the 
empirical  reliability  of  the  information  obtainable  from  other  studies  and  from  our 
preliminary  GMM  and  ML  estimates  conducted  on  reduced-form  equations  for  the 18
seven countries.
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Differently from Smets and Wouters (2003), we do not employ fixed parameters values, 
with the exception of the discount factor  β  which is fixed at 0.995 (consistent with a 
steady state real rate of 2%). Anyway, we adopt relatively tight priors for the elasticity 
of substitution among intermediate goods η and for labor disutility κ . 
Given the model assumptions described above, we estimate 17 parameters, of which 5 
define the distribution of the structural innovations and 3 their persistence. 
Concerning prior mean values, in line with Galì et al. (2004), the expected elasticity of 
substitution across intermediate goods η is set to 6, which is consistent with a steady-
state mark-up of 20%.  The mean of the labor disutility parameter κ , set to 3, is chosen 
on the basis of the ratio between hours spent at work and total available time. For both 
parameters, we assume a relatively small prior variability of, respectively, 0.3 and 0.15, 
and a normal prior shape. Concerning the Taylor rule parameters, we assume that the 
mean values for the parameter on expected inflation and for the parameter on output gap 
are, respectively, 1.5 and 0.125. Prior standard deviations are, respectively 0.15 and 
0.05 and the prior shape of the distribution is again the normal. The chosen variability 
implies a moderately diffuse prior for the first parameter and a very diffuse prior for the 
second parameter. These values are also consistent with the average ML estimates of the 
Taylor rule parameters conducted for the seven countries included in the analysis. The 
prior mean of the interest rate smoothness parameter, consistently with the average ML 
estimates, is set to 0.8, while for its variability we assume a prior of 0.10, which can be 
considered relatively large with respect to the empirical standard deviations obtained 
with the ML estimates. The chosen prior shape for the distribution of the interest rate 
smoothness parameter is the beta distribution.   
For the fraction of firms maintaining the price fixed ϕ   we assume a prior mean of 0.75, 
which is consistent with the results of Galì at al. (2001). These authors obtained an 
average duration of the price contracts of approximately one year and a rather small 
prior variability, leading to a range of duration between 3 and 6 quarters.     
For the parameters defining the persistence of shocks we follow Smets and Wouters 
(2003) and adopt a common mean value of 0.85 and a prior variability of 0.10. The 
choice of a relatively concentrated prior for the persistence parameters is justified by the 
need of having a tight separation between persistent and transitory shocks, enhancing 
the empirical identification of the two stochastic components entering the interest rate 
                                                
19 Results from this preliminary evaluation can be obtained upon request from the authors. 19
equation. The prior shape is the beta distribution.
For  the  habits  persistence  parameter  we  assume  a  prior  mean  value  of  0.7  and  a 
moderately diffuse prior variability of 0.1. The shape of the prior distribution is again 
the beta distribution. Prior mean and variability are chosen on the basis of the evidence 
emerged in a number of previous studies and on the basis of our Euler equation GMM 
estimates, modified in order to account for habit persistence.  
For  the  rule-of-thumb  parameter  we  set  a  prior  mean  of  0.5  and  a  prior  standard 
deviation of 0.10, while the reference distributional shape is again the beta. These prior 
values are consistent with the findings of Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and with our 
modified consumption equation GMM estimates for the seven major economies
20. 
For the structural shocks we adopt a parameterization which is similar to that employed 
by Smets and Wouters (2003). Apart from the large interval implied by the assumption 
of 2 degrees of freedom for the inverted gamma distribution, the prior mean values are 
obtained from previous estimates conducted with very diffuse priors. 
The table below summarizes the structural parameters’ prior distributions considered in 
the analysis. 
Table 1 about here 
3.3 Parameter estimates and country-specific simulations             
Table  2  summarizes  the  MCMC  estimates  of  the  structural  parameters  and  their 
posterior distributions, obtained with the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm.  
Concerning regime inversion, results are in line with the theoretical expectations. Given 
the estimated values for the structural parameters of the model, the regime shift is never 
observed. The size of the estimated habit persistence and rule-of-thumb parameters rule 
out the emergence an inverted IS relation.  
We  find  relevant  heterogeneity  across  countries,  in  particular  for  the  parameters 
indicating  the  fraction  of  rule-of-thumb  households  and  habit  persistence.  Since  the 
other parameters show a lower cross-country variability, the heterogeneity found with 
respect to the rule-of-thumb and the habit parameters emerges as the main cause of the 
                                                
20 Fuhrer (2000) finds that about one-fourth of income accrues to rule-of-thumb consumers in the United 
States. Muscatelli et al. (2006) find an even larger proportion. They suggest that about 37% of consumers 
are rule-of-thumb consumers, whilst 84% of total consumption in steady state is given by optimizing 
consumers. Rule-of-thumb consumers account for about 59% of total employment. Additional evidence 
on the share of rule-of-thumb consumers is provided by Jappelli (1990), Shea (1995), Parker (1999), 
Souleles (1999), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004), and Ahmad (2005). 20
differences that we get when the model is simulated employing the country-specific 
parameterization.  
Italy  shows  the  highest  rate  of  habits  (0.8),  while  Germany  the  lowest  (0.6).  The 
average habit persistence parameter is 0.7, a value that is strictly in line with the results 
obtained in previous empirical investigations.  
The average fraction of spenders for the G7 economies is 26%, a value that is well 
below the prior mean value. This value is broadly consistent with the outcomes of the 
analysis  of  Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1991),  who  obtained  a  fraction  of spenders of 
approximately 35% for the United States and 20% for the United Kingdom. It is also 
marginally  consistent  with  the  results  obtained  by  Banerjee  and  Batini  (2003)  who 
obtained a fraction of spenders of nearly 26% for the United States and of nearly 15% 
for the United Kingdom.  
Interestingly, the fraction of rule-of-thumb households in Italy, Germany and Japan is 
relatively low (nearly 7% on average), while it is high in France (0.44), in the United 
Kingdom  (0.42),  in  the  United  States  (0.37)  and  in  Canada  (0.30).  This  result  is 
surprising, since it requires explanations that are not in line with the standard view on 
the meaning of rule-of-thumb consumption. In many studies the existence of spenders is 
considered a proxy of the development and efficiency of the financial sector. As long as 
our estimates are reliable, since the higher fraction of spenders is found for countries in 
which  the  financial  markets  are  considered  developed  and  efficient,  the  standard 
interpretation  of  rule-of-thumb  consumption  appears  misleading.  Under  this 
perspective,  differences  are  more  likely  to  be  related  to  psychological  and  cultural 
factors rather than to financial factors.
21   
Table 2 about here 
The estimates also show a considerable degree of Calvo price stickiness, whose average 
estimate  is  0.84,  consistent  with  an  average  duration  of  the  price  contracts  of 
approximately 6 quarters.  
We find a significant positive central bank’s short-term reaction to the current change in 
inflation and the output gap. Our estimates deliver plausible parameters for the long and 
short-run reaction function of the monetary authorities, and results are broadly in line 
with those discussed in Taylor (1993). The parameter for the policy reaction to inflation 
is  rather  stable  across  countries  and  in  line  with  the  prior  assumptions.  Some 
                                                
21 Despite different in many respects, Japan, Germany and Italy have some relevant similarities, as for the 
importance of the generational and family transfers and for the role and the features of the banking sector. 
Moreover, they show the highest saving rates among industrialized countries. 21
heterogeneity is found with respect to the policy elasticity to the output gap. The highest 
values are obtained for the United States and for Italy (nearly 0.2), while the lowest for 
Germany (0.11), Japan, France and the United Kingdom. In agreement with the large 
literature on estimated interest rate rules, we also find evidence of a substantial degree 
of interest rate smoothing, which in addition is also rather stable across countries.     
The  simulation  of  the  DSGE  model  obtained  by  using  the  estimated  structural 
parameters  provides  an  appreciation  of  the  degree  of  heterogeneity  of  the  dynamic 
properties of the stylized economies. In particular, the simulations allow us to recognize 
the country-specific effectiveness of monetary policy and the degree of heterogeneity of 
its effects. Figure 1 contains the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, while 
Figure 2 the impulse responses to a technology shock. 
In spite of the spenders, a positive monetary shock disturbance has the standard effects 
discussed above by  reducing both inflation  and real activity  and increasing the real 
interest rate. Hump-shaped reactions are standard when in presence of habit persistence. 
Concerning the reaction to monetary policy in different countries, the biggest impulse 
response of inflation to a positive interest rate shock is found for Japan, for which the 
half-life deviation from price stability is approximately 4 quarters, while the smaller if 
found to the United States which half-life is nearly 2 quarters. The responses of output 
are even more differentiated among countries. A common feature is that the maximum 
effect  on  real  output  is  reached  after  2  quarters.  The  maximum  responsiveness  and 
duration of effects is found for the United Kingdom, the minimum for the United States. 
Figure 1 about here 
The  half-life  of  the  response  is  approximately  4  quarters  for  the  United  States,  6 
quarters for Italy, Germany and Japan, 7 for Canada and 8 quarters for United Kingdom 
and France. In line with the theoretical predictions, with the exception of the United 
States, the output sensitivity to monetary policy is thus stronger in those countries that 
show the highest fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers. 
A technology shock 
a
t ε  also has standard effects on the variables of the model. Inflation 
decreases on impact following marginal costs (Fig 8a-b). Given the monetary policy 
reaction rule, the nominal interest rate responds negatively (Fig 8c), i.e. the authorities 
tend to accommodate the shock. The hump-shaped response of output, i.e. its deviation 
from the flexible price standard response, depends on the degree of policy inertia. As 
long  as  the  nominal  interest  rate  adjustment  is  smoothed  by  the  monetary  policy 22
authorities, the real interest rate response may become positive, with counter-intuitive 
contractionary effects on output (via the IS equation).     
Figure 2 about here. 
The estimated and simulated high degree of heterogeneity in policy responses explains 
the heterogeneous impact and medium-term effects on output: they are in fact virtually 
zero on impact for the majority of the countries being considered in the analysis and 
negative for France and the United Kingdom.  
Even if obtained from a different methodological perspective, this result is in line with 
the  evidence  produced  by  Galì  (1999)  and  Basu  et  al.  (2006)  on  the  possibility  of 
“contractionary” supply  shocks.  If monetary policy does not fully accommodate the 
positive  supply  shock,  the  demand  response  is  weak  and  thus  unable  to  match  the 
potential output response, leading to a counter-cyclical employment (hours) dynamics 
which has been generally addressed as “productivity-employment puzzle.” The main 
difference here is that we do not consider this puzzle explicitly and, most importantly, 
that it implicitly emerges even considering a Taylor-like monetary rule instead of a 
money supply rule as in Galì (1999).    
4. Conclusions        
In  this  paper,  we  consider  strong  violations  of  the  Hall’s  benchmark  consumption 
function  in  a  simple  New  Keynesian  DSGE  model.  In  particular,  we  analyze  the 
implications of the joint presence of spenders and external habits in consumption for the 
local stability of the model and the effectiveness of the conduct of monetary policy. 
We  find  that  the  presence  of  spenders  can  potentially  alter  conventional  policy 
prescriptions as a stream of the recent literature has also shown. However, we find that 
the important and unconventional results only hold under some particular circumstances 
related to the response of aggregate demand to nominal interest rate movements, i.e. 
demand regimes.  
More  specifically,  we  first  show  that  models  with  rule-of-thumb  consumers  are 
consistent with two different demand regimes. In the standard regime an increase of the 
interest rate, other things equal, reduces inflation and output as usual. By contrast, in the 
inverse regime the reverse mechanism emerges: An increase of the nominal interest rate 
may increase output since deflation and decreasing markups, push-up the real wage, and 
induce spenders to consume more. Unconventional results only apply to the inverse 
regime, thus when a large number of spenders is present.  23
The analysis has evidenced that two sub-regimes may emerge in the inverse demand 
regime. A monetary policy shock initially shifts aggregate demand backwards, reducing 
real output and inflation. The reaction of the central bank to this change can imply either 
an increase or a reduction of the real interest rate. Which of the two outcomes will 
emerge depends on the size of the monetary policy effectiveness. The reverse behavior 
is only observed for low values of the monetary  policy  effectiveness,  rendering the 
central bank’s reaction insufficient to reverse the effect of the shock. The policy regime 
that will emerge thus depends on both monetary policy effectiveness and the demand 
regime. 
The probability of an inverse regime increases with the size of the fraction of spenders. 
However,  the  inversion  is  also  strongly  influenced  by  the  presence  of  consumption 
habits in a highly non-linear manner. From the numerical solution and simulation of the 
model,  we  have  obtained  that  that,  ceteris  paribus,  the  threshold  value  of  spenders 
needed to obtain the regime inversion increases with the size of the habit persistence 
parameter. Hence, by introducing habits, the probability of observing a demand regime 
shift decreases.  
The empirical relevance of our theoretical hypotheses has been evaluated by estimating 
the  structural  parameters  of  the  DSGE  model  for  the  seven  most  industrialized 
economies. Then, the structural estimates have been employed for obtaining country-
specific simulations of the dynamics of the stylized economies.  
The analysis has evidenced the effectiveness of the monetary policy in stabilizing the 
business  cycle  in  all  the  countries  considered.  However,  it  has  also  highlighted  the 
presence of relevant heterogeneity in the monetary transmission mechanisms among 
countries considered. The presence of this heterogeneity in the monetary transmission 
channels stimulates a serious reconsideration of the policy prescriptions neglecting that 
the differences among economies may result decisive in the determination of the effects 
of the policy, in particular monetary policy.  
An  additional  result  of  our  analysis  is  that,  despite  the  heterogeneous  sensitivity  to 
shocks, the dynamic properties of all the model economies are qualitatively in line with 
those predicted by the conventional New Keynesian DSGE model. In particular, the 
estimated values of the structural parameters rule out the possibility of a demand regime 
inversion due to the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers. Even though the fraction of 
spenders is relevant in many countries (0.26 on average), in none of them this fraction is 
high enough to generate the regime inversion. A further interesting result is that, despite 24
the model is theoretically able to generate the so-called “price puzzle” for habits and 
rule-of-thumb  parameters  values  that  are  not  prohibitively  high,  the  estimation  has 
generated a parameterization that is not consistent with this result. 
Appendix A – Determinacy 
Determinacy is studied by augmenting the log-linearized dynamic system with a simple 
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Stability depends on the eigen-structure of the following matrix: 
A2  ( ) ( )
1 1 1











￿ ￿ −Ω + Ω − −Ω −Ω −Ω ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ − − ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
By indicating with  () D .  and  () T .  the determinant and trace operators, we have: 
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The  eigen-structure  of  matrix  M   is  studied  as  in  Woodford  (2003:  Appendices  to 
Chapter 4). Since the analysis of the standard regime does not differs from Woodford 
(2003), we only consider the liquidity-constrained regime.  
Determinacy requires either:  
i) ( ) 1 D M > , i.e.  ( )
1 1
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Being:  
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from equations A4 and A5 we derive conditions (11) and (12), respectively.  
Regarding the relationship between determinacy and effectiveness of monetary policy 
under  a  standard  Taylor  rule,  determinacy  requires  (11)  and  (12),  but  since 
                                                
22 In order to investigate the stability properties we do not need to look at the stochastic part that is thus 
omitted for the sake of brevity. We assume stationary disturbance processes. 25
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From  conditions  1a)  and  2a)  follow  that  a  standard  Taylor  principle  holds  for  a 
relatively high effectiveness a more aggressive principle should be used for a relatively 
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 and condition 2b is always binding. 
Summarizing the above results we obtain the result reported in section 2.3.  
Appendix B – Monetary policy transmission (policy regimes)




























where εt is a white-noise monetary disturbance. From equation (6) and (10), using the 
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, from which 
the discussion in the main text can be derived.  
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Table 1. Prior distributions for the structural parameters 
Parameter  Definition Prior shape Prior mean  Prior S.D.
sigma_e_a Structural technology shock inv_gamma 0.010 2
sigma_e_IS Structural technology shock inv_gamma 0.010 2
sigma_e_pi Structural technology shock inv_gamma 0.010 2
sigma_e_i Structural technology shock inv_gamma 0.010 2
sigma_e_dP Structural technology shock inv_gamma 0.010 2
rho_a Persistence parameter for tech. shock beta 0.850 0.10
rho_IS Persistence parameter for tech. shock beta 0.850 0.10
rho_pi Persistence parameter for tech. shock beta 0.850 0.10
rho_i Smoothness parameter for nominal interest beta 0.800 0.10
beta Discount factor - 0.995 0
eta Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods normal 6.000 0.30
k Labor disutility normal 3.000 0.15
psi_pi Taylor rule parameter on inflation  normal 1.500 0.15
psi_x Taylor rule parameter on output gap normal 0.125 0.05
phi Calvo parameter  beta 0.750 0.10
gamma Habits persistence parameter beta 0.700 0.10
lambda Fraction of rule of thumb consumers beta 0.500 0.10
Note: for the inverted gamma distribution the degrees of freedom are indicated 30
Table 2.  MCMC estimates of the structural parameters. G7 countries 
Parameter  Mean inf sup Mean inf sup Mean inf sup Mean inf sup
sigma_e_a 0.049 0.048 0.050 0.039 0.033 0.045 0.326 0.294 0.358 0.136 0.125 0.146
sigma_e_IS 0.118 0.113 0.123 0.093 0.090 0.097 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.128 0.122 0.135
sigma_e_pi 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.024
sigma_e_i 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
sigma_e_dP 0.167 0.159 0.175 0.239 0.227 0.251 0.238 0.229 0.247 0.148 0.133 0.163
rho_a 0.751 0.735 0.767 0.747 0.737 0.757 0.827 0.815 0.839 0.707 0.695 0.718
rho_IS 0.947 0.946 0.949 0.936 0.934 0.938 0.828 0.827 0.830 0.874 0.866 0.882
rho_pi 0.754 0.744 0.763 0.971 0.967 0.976 0.842 0.841 0.844 0.933 0.932 0.933
rho_i 0.802 0.801 0.803 0.860 0.858 0.863 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.877 0.876 0.878
beta 0.995 - - 0.995 - - 0.995 - - 0.995 - -
eta 5.864 5.810 5.917 6.141 6.096 6.186 6.030 6.001 6.059 5.936 5.865 6.008
k 3.196 3.143 3.250 2.997 2.977 3.018 3.076 3.036 3.116 3.032 3.009 3.055
psi_pi 1.497 1.493 1.502 1.552 1.518 1.587 1.485 1.474 1.496 1.495 1.494 1.495
psi_x 0.229 0.195 0.263 0.130 0.117 0.144 0.128 0.126 0.130 0.133 0.133 0.134
phi 0.839 0.833 0.846 0.821 0.817 0.825 0.864 0.864 0.865 0.854 0.854 0.854
gamma 0.701 0.687 0.714 0.742 0.729 0.756 0.611 0.610 0.612 0.685 0.684 0.685
lambda 0.354 0.298 0.409 0.095 0.065 0.126 0.075 0.049 0.102 0.442 0.441 0.443
Mean inf sup Mean inf sup Mean inf sup Mean inf sup
sigma_e_a 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.026 0.032 0.047 0.045 0.049 0.088 0.083 0.092
sigma_e_IS 0.063 0.060 0.066 0.126 0.109 0.143 0.089 0.079 0.099 0.094 0.088 0.101
sigma_e_pi 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.012
sigma_e_i 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
sigma_e_dP 0.198 0.182 0.214 0.325 0.287 0.364 0.243 0.204 0.281 0.223 0.203 0.242
rho_a 0.738 0.674 0.802 0.853 0.825 0.881 0.812 0.778 0.846 0.776 0.751 0.801
rho_IS 0.886 0.876 0.896 0.926 0.909 0.943 0.904 0.899 0.908 0.900 0.894 0.906
rho_pi 0.978 0.966 0.990 0.981 0.970 0.992 0.988 0.978 0.998 0.921 0.914 0.928
rho_i 0.879 0.876 0.883 0.863 0.846 0.879 0.837 0.827 0.847 0.848 0.843 0.853
beta 0.995 - - 0.995 - - 0.995 - - 0.995 - -
eta 5.965 5.930 5.999 5.945 5.861 6.029 5.959 5.896 6.022 5.977 5.923 6.031
k 3.065 2.995 3.136 3.117 3.060 3.173 3.089 3.039 3.139 3.082 3.037 3.126
psi_pi 1.509 1.504 1.514 1.521 1.429 1.614 1.425 1.399 1.452 1.498 1.473 1.523
psi_x 0.142 0.140 0.145 0.242 0.199 0.285 0.142 0.129 0.156 0.164 0.148 0.180
phi 0.804 0.804 0.805 0.853 0.837 0.869 0.868 0.852 0.884 0.843 0.837 0.850
gamma 0.643 0.641 0.644 0.832 0.804 0.859 0.729 0.723 0.735 0.706 0.697 0.715
lambda 0.433 0.427 0.439 0.090 0.062 0.119 0.339 0.301 0.377 0.261 0.235 0.288
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Figure 1. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, M-H MCMC estimates  






























































Computations obtained with Dynare for Matlab.32
Figure 2. Impulse responses to a technology shock, M-H MCMC estimates  





























































Computations obtained with Dynare for Matlab.